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Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry and Dixit-Pindyck option values
under strategic interactions
Abstract
We extend the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry (AFHH) and Dixit-Pindyck (DP) option
values to game situations. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the
surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with the
conceptual diculty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic
interactions. We then introduce the DP option value into a game situation. We show that
the equivalence between the expected value of information and the DP option value in the
standard model does not hold under strategic interactions.
Keywords: Irreversibility, Quasi-option values, Biodiversity, Uncertainty, Value of Information
JEL classication codes: C72, H43, Q50.
1 Introduction
The value of the prospect of future information is often ignored in the standard analysis of net
present value. Ignoring it, however, tends to bias the decisions. In private investment analysis,
future information may allow the investors to make state-contingent decisions and thereby avoid
unnecessary sunk costs. As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) emphasize, the opportunity cost due to
the forgone opportunity to delay the investment, or the Dixit-Pindyck (DP) option value, must
be included in the cost of immediate investment in addition to direct investment costs.
The prospect of future information also plays an important role in the analysis of public
projects. Suppose, for example, that a policy maker has to choose whether to develop or conserve
a forest. The forest may (or may not) contain economically valuable plants, but such plants
may be discovered only in the future (say, by independent scientic research), if they exist
in the forest at all. Then, ignoring the possibility of the future discovery of plants will bias
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the current decision towards development. Therefore, the policy maker has to incorporate the
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry (AFHH) option value due to Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry
(1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987), and Hanemann (1989), also called the quasi-option value,
into the analysis to reect this possibility. This concept is related to but generally dierent from
the (unconditional) expected value of information (EVI) (Conrad, 1980; Hanemann, 1989). The
AFHH option value is also related to the DP option value. In fact, Fisher (2000) claimed that
they are identical, though this argument was subsequently proved incorrect by Mensink and
Requate (2005).
In the studies of the AFHH and DP option values, the presence of a single decision-maker is
typically assumed. For example, when there is a social planner who can stipulate the action of
each player in the society, it is sucient to have only one decision maker in the model. Even if
this is not the case, when the market is competitive and each player has negligible impacts on
other players, a single decision-maker model would still be appropriate.
However, in many practical situations, the single decision-maker model is not appropriate.
The policy-maker may have to take the competition among rms or dierent public entities as
given. A rm may compete with only a few other rms in the same industry and its decision
may have non-negligible impacts on other rms.
This is important, because the AFHH option value is conceptually problematic in the pres-
ence of strategic interactions, as some outcomes may not be supported as an equilibrium, as
argued by Fujii and Ishikawa (2012). Furthermore, the EVI for the society critically depends
on how the information is held and released. They have shown that the prospect of future
information could even be harmful to everyone in the society, a situation that never happens in
a single decision-maker model. Therefore, we cannot appropriately take the prospect of future
information into account without taking into account the strategic interactions in the society.
In this study, we extend Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) in two ways. First, we provide an alter-
native interpretation to the AFHH option value. In this interpretation, the AFHH option value
is taken as the change in a surplus measure for development (or immediate investment) because
of the prospect of future information. This allows us to overcome the conceptual diculties
pointed out by Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) and to dene the AFHH option value even in the
presence of strategic interactions. However, unlike the case of a single decision-maker, studied
by Hanemann (1989), our AFHH option value cannot be interpreted as the conditional value of
information.
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Second, we also extend the discussion on the relationship between AFHH and DP option
values by Fisher (2000) and Mensink and Requate (2005) to a game situation. We argue that
whether the AFHH option value is more relevant than the DP option value would depend on
the degree of control that the regulator has on the strategic interactions in the society. We also
show that the DP option value in the single decision-maker case is identical to the EVI, but this
equivalence does not hold in the presence of strategic interactions. These points reinforce the
nding of Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) that social cost-benet analyses require a careful assessment
of strategic interactions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a simple model of an irreversible
decision under strategic interactions rst proposed by Fujii and Ishikawa (2012). This model
is a straightforward extension of the single decision-maker model widely used in the literature.
Because we adopt the same model and notations as Fujii and Ishikawa (2012), we only provide
a brief summary below and omit a detailed discussion on the motivation of the way the model is
formulated. In Section 3, we introduce the AFHH and DP option values in the standard single
decision-maker case. Most of the results in this section, except for Proposition 1, are not new,
but they serve as a reference case. We then extend the AFHH and DP option values to a game
situation in Section 4. Section 5 provides some discussion.
2 Setup
There are two time periods: periods 1 (current period) and period 2 (future period). The future
state is uncertain. The state s takes a good state s1 with probability  and a bad state s2
with probability 1   . There are two risk-neutral players  and , each of whom cares only
about their own payo, and a regulator. In each period, each player i 2 f; g takes an action,
dit 2 f0; 1g, where dit = 0 represents conservation (or no immediate investment in the context
of the DP option value) and dit = 1 represents development (or immediate investment). The
decision to develop is irreversible and thus di1  di2. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the
sequence of actions taken by player i by di  (di1; di2). For the simplicity of argument, we assume
that each player always chooses to develop if the player is indierent between conservation and
development.
We normalize the payos so that the player receives a payo of zero in each period he
chooses conservation. We assume that the total payo in present value for the two players from
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development is a in period 1 and b  Ind(s = s1) c  Ind(s = s2) in period 2 for positive constants
a, b, and c, where Ind() is an indicator function that takes value one if the argument is true
and zero otherwise. Therefore, development is benecial to the society in the good state and
harmful in the bad state. We assume that the total payo is shared equally by the two players
when they take the same sequence of actions. When one player chooses a sequence (1; 1) (i.e.,
development in both periods) and the opponent chooses a sequence (0; 1) (i.e., conservation in
period 1 and development in period 2), the leader [follower] of development, who chooses the
sequence (1; 1) [(0; 0)], takes a share of k [1   k] in the total payo from the development in
period 2 for some constant k 2 (0; 1).
We assume that new information becomes available to the regulator so that the regulator
knows the true state after period 1 but before actions are taken by players in period 2. We use
the hat (^) and the asterisk () notations to denote the cases with and without the prospect of
future information, respectively. Furthermore, we use the tilde (~) notation to denote the case
where the option to delay the decision to develop is not available, which corresponds to the case
where the sequence (0; 1) is not allowed. We also assume that the game structure and probability
distribution of the states are common knowledge and that the regulator tries to maximize the
expected total payos in the society (i.e., the sum of the payos for players  and ) for the two
periods, which we refer to as the social welfare. The latter assumption can be justied when the
regulator can transfer the payos between the players in a lump-sum manner.
3 Case (I): Social planner
As with Fujii and Ishikawa (2012), we start with the case where the regulator is a social planner,
who can stipulate the action of each player. This is de facto a single decision-maker case. Because
the social welfare is determined only by the timing of development and not by who chooses
to develop, we simply impose d = d in this section. This allows us to avoid unnecessary
complications and treat the action of player  as the action of a representative player. Given
the setup presented in Section 2 and assuming a rational choice in period 2, we can write the
value functions, or the social welfare, as a function of the current action d1 , in the following
4
manner1:
V^ (d1 ) = B + (a  C)  Ind(d1 = 1) (1)
V (d1 ) = max(B   C; 0)  Ind(d1 = 0) + (a+B   C)  Ind(d1 = 1) (2)
Thus, the social planner chooses d1 to maximize V^ [V
] in the presence [absence] of the prospect
of future information. Using these value functions, the AFHH option value can be found as
follows:
OV AFHHI  (V^ (0)  V^ (1))  (V (0)  V (1)) = V^ (0)  V (0) = min(B;C): (3)
The AFHH option value can be interpreted as the correction term that must be added to
the net present value of conservation relative to development when the net present value is
calculated ignoring the prospect of future information. The third expression shows that the
AFHH option value is the change in the expected total payo for the society from the prospect
of future information, given that conservation is chosen in period 1. Thus, the AFHH option
value can be interpreted as the conditional value of information (Hanemann, 1989).
It is also possible to give the AFHH option value an alternative interpretation. We can
interpret ^I  V^ (0)   V^ (1) as a surplus measure of conservation relative to development when
future information is available. This is the minimum transfer of payo that must be given to
the regulator to ensure development takes place in period 1. In the current setup, this is the
smallest number that has to be added to a to make the regulator indierent between conservation
and development in period 1. This number is negative if the regulator prefers development to
conservation. We can similarly dene I for the case without the prospect of future information.
Given these denitions, we have OV AFHHI = ^I   I . As we argue in the next section, this
alternative interpretation allows us to dene the AFHH option value in a game situation.
Mensink and Requate (2005) argue that the DP option value can be dened as follows:
OV DPI  max

V^ (0); V^ (1)

 max   B0; V (1) ; (4)
where B0 is the default value in the net present value decision rule. It reects the present value
of the stream of payos that would emerge if no investment decision is made at any time. In our
1See Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) for the derivation of this result.
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model, this is equal to choosing conservation in both periods, which implies that B0 = 0. In this
denition, the regulator is assumed to commit in period 1 to either conservation or development
for both periods under the net present value decision rule. Thus, the DP option value can be
thought of as the value arising from the exibility to delay the decision to develop (or invest).
A concept related to the AFHH and DP option values is the EVI dened as follows:
EV II  max

V^ (0); V^ (1)

 max (V (0); V (1)) : (5)
The EVI is the additional expected total payo from the future information. If we dene
W^I  max

V^ (0); V^ (1)

and W I  max (V (0); V (1)), they can be interpreted as the social
welfare when the regulator behaves rationally given the availability of future information. Thus,
EV II = W^I  W I is the change in the social welfare from future information. Similarly, if we
dene ~W I  max( B0; V (1)), OV DP = W^I   ~W I . It turns out, however, that the DP option
value is identical to the EVI in the current setup:
Proposition 1 Given the setup in Section 2, we have the following:
OV DPI = EV II = (C   a)  Ind(a  C < a+B) +B  Ind(a+B  C) (6)
We omit the formal proof because it is straightforward. Intuitively, the result can be understood
in the following manner. When there is no prospect of future information, the social planner
simply loses the opportunity cost, a, when he chooses to conserve in period 1. Therefore, a
rational social planner chooses either (0; 0) or (1; 1); he never chooses (0; 1). Therefore, even
though V (0) 6= 0 in general, this occurs only when V (1) = V^ (1) > V (0) > 0, in which case
we have max(V (0); V (1)) = max(0; V (1)) = V (1) = V^ (1).
Put dierently, the prospect of future information can only make conservation more attractive
in period 1. Hence, if development is more attractive than conservation in period 1 in the absence
of information, then development is certainly more attractive in period 1 in the presence of
information. In this case, the DP option value and EVI are both zero because it does not help
the regulator to have exible decision or the prospect of future information. In the absence of
information, conservation must be more attractive than development in period 2, if it is more
attractive in period 1. In this case, V (0) = 0 must hold, equating OV DPI with EV II.
By comparing Eq. (3) and Eq. (6), we have the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 OV AFHHI , OV
DP
I , and EV II satisfy the following relationship:
EV II = OV
DP
I = OV
AFHH
I  Ind(a < C) + PPV  Ind(a+B > C > a) ( 0); (7)
where PPV  V (0) V (1) =  a+max(0; C B) is what Mensink and Requate (2005) call the
pure postponement value. Clearly, EV II = OV
DP
I = OV
AFHH
I when a + B < C. However, as
Hanemann (1989) has shown, OV AFHHI 6= EV II(= OV DPI ) in general. In fact, Eq. (7) is simply
a restatement of Eq. (17) in his paper and the generalization of the results presented by Mensink
and Requate (2005). Thus, the results presented here are not new, except for Proposition 1.
However, the case of the social planner serves as a reference case.
4 Case (II): Strategic interactions
In this section, we let the players interact strategically with each other. That is, each player
chooses his action so as to maximize his payo for the two periods. As with Fujii and Ishikawa
(2012), we take the ecient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the relevant solution concept.
The subgame played in period 2 is determined by the action prole (d1 ; d

1 ) in period 1.
Given the setup in Section 2, each player i 2 f; g has three possible pure strategies
di 2 f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g when future information is not available. When information is available
in period 2, each player can take a state-contingent action. Therefore, if conservation is chosen
in period 1, the set of strategies for player i in the subgame in period 2 is f0; Ind(s = s1); Ind(s =
s2); 1g. However, because Ind(s = s1) dominates the other strategies, we only need to consider
the following two strategies di 2 f(0; Ind(s = s1)); (1; 1)g. The payo matrices for these cases
are given in Table 1.
With some slight abuse of terminology, we shall use the cell index in Table 1 to specify a
prole of the sequence of actions. For example, b) refers to the prole (d; d) = ((0; 0); (0; 1)).
The equilibrium prole in the absence of future information is: a) if C   B > a; e) if a <
(1=2   k)(B   C) and k < 1=2; i) if a  C   B  0 or a  (1   2k)(B   C)  0; and f) or
h) otherwise. In the presence of future information, the equilibrium is: a^) if a < (1 + Ind(k 
1=2))(k   1=2)B + C; d^) if a  (1  2k)B + C; and b^) or c^) otherwise.2
We can now introduce the EVI and the AFHH and DP option values for the society in the
2When we have multiple asymmetric equilibria, we can choose an arbitrary equilibrium because the choice
does not aect the social welfare.
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current context. As Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) argue, the EVI in this case is simply the change
in the expected total payo for the two periods due to the information. Let W^II and W

II be the
equilibrium social welfare (i.e., the expected total payo in the equilibrium for the two players
summed over the two periods). For example, when C   B > a, the equilibrium is a^) and a)
with and without information in period 2, respectively, and thus we have W^II = B and W

II = 0.
Using W^II and W

II, we can dene and compute the EVI for the current case as follows:
EV IS  W^II  W II (8)
=
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
C   a if (a+ (2k   1)B < C  a+B and k  12 ;
or if max

a+ (k   12)B;B   2a1 2k

< C < B + a and k < 12
B if C > B + a
C if C < B   2a1 2k and k < 12
0 if otherwise.
(9)
To apply the DP option value in the current case, we need to consider the change in the
social welfare due to the exibility to delay the decision. When the players can choose a state-
contingent action, the social welfare is clearly W^II. The question is, therefore, what the relevant
social welfare is under the net present value decision rule, when the exibility is ignored. We
argue that the regulator in this case would be able to distribute a development right free to the
players in period 1. This right can be exercised only in period 1. Thus, the player has to commit
to development or conservation in period 1. They cannot choose the sequence (0; 1). Therefore,
the equilibrium in the absence of future information is a) if C > a+ B and i) otherwise. We
denote the equilibrium social welfare by ~W II(= max(0; a+B  C)). With these considerations,
we can now dene the DP option value for the current case.
OV DPS  W^II   ~W II: (10)
Notice that this denition coincides with OV DPI , if the regulator can stipulate the action of each
player. It is straightforward to show the following:
Proposition 3 From Eqs. (9) and (10), we have:
EV IS = OV
DP
S + a  Ind(a < (1=2  k)(B   C) and k < 1=2): (11)
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Proposition 3 shows that the equivalence between the EVI and DP option values does not
hold when a < (1=2  k)(B  C) and k < 1=2. This is because development takes place only in
period 2 under this condition, a result that is not expected from Case (I). This also underscores
the point that cost-benet analysis calls for a careful assessment of the default value in the
presence of strategic interactions.
A notable point here is that both EVI and DP option value can be negative. Fujii and
Ishikawa (2012) have shown that EVI is negative if and only if k < 1=2, C < a, and 2(a C)=(1 
2k) < B < C+2a=(1 2k). The DP option value is negative if and only if 0 > C a > (k 1=2)B,
which holds only if k < 1=2. Therefore, having additional information or exibility to delay the
decision can actually harm the social welfare.
Now, let us turn to the AFHH option value in the current case. Fujii and Ishikawa (2012)
have shown that the AFHH option value has a conceptual diculty in the presence of strategic
interactions because the value function is not meaningful when a particular outcome (i.e., de-
velopment or conservation) is not supported as an equilibrium. To circumvent this problem, we
adopt the alternative interpretation of the AFHH option value and extend it to a game situation
by rst considering surplus measures ^ and  of conservation. We dene them as the minimum
amount of payo that can be added to a to support development as an equilibrium. Notice that
a is positive [non-positive] when the equilibrium outcome is conservation [development].
According to this denition, the surplus measure can be found by looking at the dierence
in the individual payos between conservation and development when the opponent is choosing
development. When the information about the state becomes available in period 2, this can be
done by taking the dierence of the payo for player  [player ] between cells a^) and c^) [cells
a^) and b^)].
^II =
B
2
  (a+ kB   C) =

1
2
  k

B + C   a: (12)
When the information is not available, we can compute  in the following manner. Using
the backward induction, the reduced payo matrix consists of e), f), h), and i) when B > C,
and a), c), g), and i) when B  C. Therefore, we have:
II = ((1=2  k)(B   C)  a)  Ind(B > C)  (a+B   C) Ind(B  C): (13)
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Using Eqs. (12) and (13), we can dene the AFHH option value for the current case as follows:
OV AFHHS  ^II   II = (3=2  k)min(B;C) = (3=2  k)OV AFHHI (> 0): (14)
There are ve points to note here. First, our denition of OV AFHHS is a direct extension of
OV AFHHI . If the regulator can stipulate the actions of the two players, OV
AFHH
S coincides with
OV AFHHI .
Second, Eq. (14) clearly shows that the change in the surplus measure of development because
information is inuenced by strategic interactions. It also shows that OV AFHHS = OV
AFHH
I
if and only if k = 1=2. This is because the strategy taken by the opponent does not change
the incentive structure when k = 1=2. For example, in the absence of the prospect of future
information, each player chooses to develop in this case if and only if a+B   C  0 regardless
of the opponent's strategy.
Third, while we have successfully extended the denition of AFHH option value, the point
made by Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) is still valid. That is, some outcomes are not supported as
an equilibrium, and thus the standard value functions used in Case (I) are not meaningful. This
also means that it is not possible to interpret OV AFHHS as the conditional value of information,
unlike the single decision-maker case studied by Hanemann (1989).
Fourth, Eq. (14) shows that the AFHH option value is positive. The AFHH option value in
the current case is the change of payo needed to induce development in light of the prospect of
future information. Since the prospect of future information makes conservation more attractive
in period 1, the results are intuitive. Option value tends to be higher when k is lower, because the
players face stronger incentives to conserve in period 1 when information will become available
in period 2. That is, in addition to the fact that they can choose to develop only when the state
is good, they can also enjoy a higher share of b if they are the follower in development. Fifth,
the AFHH option value is dierent from the DP option values and the EVI, which would not
be surprising given Proposition 2.
5 Discussion
In this study, we have extended the AFHH and DP option values to a game situation. One
novelty of this study is that, by reinterpreting the AFHH option value as the change in the
surplus of development because of future information, we have overcome the conceptual diculty
11
of the AFHH option value pointed by Fujii and Ishikawa (2012). While the AFHH and DP
option values and the EVI discussed above are related to each other, the appropriate choice of
these measures in a practical application of cost-benet analysis would depend on the policy
instruments that are available to the regulator. For example, if the regulator simply passes
information to the players with no additional policy instruments, the EVI would be the measure
that the regulator would ultimately be interested in. The regulator can choose to pass on the
information if and only if EVI is positive.
The AFHH option value will be relevant if the cost-benet analyst wants to measure the value
of development. Unlike the single decision-maker case, this measurement may be complicated in
a game situation because the regulator cannot directly implement development. Our approach
is to use a minimum hypothetical transfer to induce development. We chose the parameter a
for this transfer because this parameter directly changes the net present value of development.
However, under some circumstances, the regulator may be able to make, for example, state-
contingent transfers. In such a case, the AFHH option value may be altered.
The DP option value is most relevant in a situation where the regulator can choose whether
the players have to make a commitment to either conservation or development in period 1,
for example, by distributing free development rights in period 1, which can be exercised only
immediately. Such a situation may arise in practice because the regulator may be short-lived,
in the sense that the opportunity to develop is lost for ever when the person in charge in the
regulating body changes.
This study has highlighted the fact that the AFHH and DP option values and the EVI all
depend on the way players interact with each other, a point that has largely been neglected in the
literature. Therefore, social cost-benet analyses under strategic interactions require a careful
assessment of the information and policy instruments that may be available to the regulator in
the future.
References
Arrow, K. J., and A. C. Fisher (1974) `Environmental preservation, uncertainty, and irreversibil-
ity.' Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 312{319
Conrad, J. M. (1980) `Quasi-option value and the expected value of information.' Quarterly
Journal of Economics 95, 813{820
12
Dixit, A.K., and R.S. Pindyck (1994) Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University
Press)
Fisher, A.C. (2000) `Investment under uncertainty and option value in environmental economics.'
Resource and Energy Economics 22, 197{204
Fisher, A.C., and W. M. Hanemann (1987) `Quasi-option value: Some misconceptions dispelled.'
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14, 183{190
Fujii, T., and R. Ishikawa (2012) `Quasi-option value under strategic interactions.' Resource and
Energy Economics 34, 36{54
Hanemann, W. M. (1989) `Information and the concept of option value.' Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 16, 23{37
Henry, C. (1974) `Investment decisions under uncertainty: The irreversibility eect.' American
Economic Review 64, 1006{1012
Mensink, P., and T. Requate (2005) `The Dixit-Pindyck and Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry
option values are not equivalent: a note on Fisher (2000).' Resource and Energy Economics
27, 83{88
13
